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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant for 
damages arising out of a power-outage occuring at Plaintiffs' 
egg ranch in August of 19 73. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On April 5th through 7th, 1976, this case was tried to 
a jury before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock. Prior to trial 
the Court ordered that the trial be bifurcated with liability 
being first determined. After presentation of Plaintiffs'/claims 
of breach of contract, breach of warranty of fitness, strict 
liability, res ipsa loquitur and third-party beneficiary lia-
bility. The only remaining liability theory was that of negligence 
and the case was submitted to the jury on that theory. 
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A special verdict was given to the jury and was 
returned showing 10% negligence attributable to Defendants 
and 90% negligence attributable to Plaintiffs* Judgment on 
the special verdict was entered by the Court on April 12, 
19 76, in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs, 
no cause of action• It is from this judgment this appeal 
has been taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the trial court's 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent would disagree with many of the characteri-
zations and statements made by the Appellants in their state-
ment of facts. Since this appeal is based solely on questions 
of law, neither party has transcribed the majority of testi-
mony so that no record references can be supplied except as 
to the limited transcript requested. 
Plaintiffs, Al Rigtrup, Mark Petersen, Bud Shepherd 
and Leon Zeeman are individuals who formed a partnership known 
as the Lake Shore Egg Ranch. Defendant is a Utah corporation 
with its principal place of business in Utah County and is a 
public utility operating under the authority of the Public 
Service Commission. In the fall of 1972, Plaintiffs contacted 
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Defendant and asked if power could be supplied to a new 
building site of chicken coops near Lake Shore, Utah. 
Defendants agents replied that such power could be supplied 
and that Defendant would be pleased to do so. During these 
discussions Defendant informed Plaintiffs that a "three-
phase 7200 volt system" would ultimately be installed in the 
area at some future time. At the present, however, Defendant 
installed a single-phase 2400 volt line to the site and a 
transformer was also installed within a week after this meeting. 
The lines and the transformer were the property of the Defendant. 
After these lines had been installedtPlaintiffsf electri-fy 
cian installed the private electrical equipment needed to 
operate the Plaintiffs1 coop. This equipment consisted of an 
electrical line from the transformer to the weatherhead 
("called a pig-tail"), the weatherhead, a connecting conduit 
and wires to the meter base, a meter base (but without the 
meter), a circuit breaker and wiring from the circuit breaker 
to the coops. Except for the meter which plugs into the meter 
base and which was owned by Defendant, all of the equipment 
beyond the transformer (the point of delivery as defined in 
the Electrical Service Regulations), was owned, installed and 
maintained by the Plaintiffs. 
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i 
In January of 1973, Defendant's employee informed one 
of the Plaintiffs that a stand-by power system should be pro-
vided by the Plaintiffs because 24-hour power could not be 
guaranteed. In April of 1973, the roof of the first chicken 
coop which Plaintiffs built collapsed and killed 2,000 chickens. * 
In May of 19 73, a meeting was held between employees of the 
Defendant and several of the Plaintiffs. At this time, Defen-
i 
dants informed Plaintiffs that they would install a 3-phase 
7200 volt line to the coops because the company wanted to 
equalize its entire system load. This was not because of any { 
power inadequacy and Plaintiffs were assured that the power 
supply of the present system would be sufficient to take care 
of both coops. During this meeting, however, Plaintiffs were 
warned by Defendant's employee that Plaintiffs' own electrical 
system would not be adequate to handle the full electrical 
load drawn by two chicken coops. In early June of that year 
both coops went into full operation. 
Shortly after the second coop was placed in operation, I 
Defendant installed a 25 KVA transformer to replace the 15 KVA 
transformer since it had been shown the former transformer was 
I 
inadequate to handle the load being drawn by the two coops. 
At this time, Defendant's employees discussed with Plaintiffs 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the necessity of having an emergency generator as well as 
the inadequacy of Plaintiffs1 existing system. On at least 
two separate occasions Plaintiffs experienced power outages 
because of an overload caused by their power usage. At other 
times the Defendant planned power outages for short periods 
but notified Plaintiffs so preparations could be made. 
In July of 19 73 an employee of Plaintiff's discovered 
that the power had terminated and immediately contacted 
Defendant which sent out crews within 10 to 15 minutes. At 
that time, Defendant's employees found that a portion of 
Plaintiffs' electrical system had shorted out causing the 
power failure. Plaintiffs' employees were shown the broken 
wires and was told that the system should be re-wired. 
During this period, the work on the 7200 volt line had 
commenced and was proceeding as rapidly as possible on an 
intermittent basis towards the Plaintiffs' business. During 
this period of time, several conversations occurred between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants concerning the completion of this 
line but no definite date was ever given. The Plaintiffs 
could physically watch the construction of this system along 
the road to their ranch and were aware of its progress at 
all times. 
-5-
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4 
On August 9, 19 73, the accident giving rise to this 
litigation occurred. On that night, Mr. Petersen, Manager
 t 
and partner of the ranch, left the ranch at approximately 
6:30 P.M. to visit his mother-in-law in the hospital. He 
returned home after 9:00 P.M. and found the power out. He ' 
contacted the Defendant and it immediately sent a repair 
crew. When .the crew arrived, it found that the wires in the 
i 
weatherhead portion of Plaintiffs1 electrical system had been 
burned off causing the outage. The power was restored in 
approximately 20 minutes after the arrival of the crew. 4 
Approximately 40,000 chickens were killed because of this 
power outage. At the time of the outage, Plaintiffs had 
installed a generator system but had not installed the auto-
matic transfer unit activating it. Also, Plaintiffs had no 
alarm system at that time to warn of a loss of power. 
Based upon this evidence, the jury returned a special 
verdict stating that Plaintiffs were 90% negligent and 
Defendant was 10% negligent and also finding that Plaintiff ^ 
had assumed the risk of not having adequate power. A judg-
ment was accordingly entered in favor of Defendant. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial. At the 
hearing (R. 137-151) Plaintiffs argued that the assumption 
of risk instructions were prejudicial, that their proposed 
instructions should have been given, and that the exclusions 
of exhibits were improper. The trial court denied this 
motion and stated during the hearing that there was probably 
error in even submitting the case to the jury. The Court 
stated: 
"I think there may have been some error in even 
submitting it to the jury on negligence. 
. • ' • • • . . 
And Ifm just about convinced that the proximate 
cause of this loss to the plaintiff was the 
failure of the plaintiff to notify the company 
that the power had gone out. Because it wasnft 
the lack of power that electricuted the chickens 
or anything of that nature, it was the fact that 
the power didn't get turned on in time and the 
chickens suffocated." (R. 145) 
Thus, Plaintiffs were fortunate in even having their 
case submitted to the jury on any theory in light of the strong 
evidence against them and the rejection of all of their legal 
liability theories by the trial court except for negligence. 
The Plaintiffs1 attempt to find error from the jury 
instructions relating to assumption of risk ignores the state 
of the evidence and the strong mandate from the jury reflecting 
the total futility of Plaintiffs1 claims. 
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i 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY REGARDING ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
Plaintiffs in their brief argue that the trial court 
( 
erred in instructing the jury on assumption of risk in light 
of the 1973 comparative negligence statute, Section 78-27-37. 
Plaintiffs argue further that the doctrine of assumption of | 
risk should be abolished under the new comparative negligence 
standard. These arguments are without merit. 
The recent development of the comparative negligence 
standard in many states has not had the effect upon the 
doctrine of assumption of risk which Plaintiffs would lead 
this Court to believe. Some states have refused to recognize 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk long before 
comparative negligence was ever accepted. The majority of 4 
courts, however, recognize the distinction between contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk as is illustrated by 
4 
the following excerpt from an annotation dealing with this 
subject: 
Most of the courts take the view that while the g 
defenses of assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence are closely associated, frequently 
over-lapping, or shading into each other, and 
often difficult to distinguish, the terms often 
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being used interchangeably, nevertheless, the 
two defenses should not be confused, they are 
not synonomous, but independent, separate and 
distinct defenses, which are not inconsistent 
and may co-exist and be present in the same 
case. The two defenses are based on different 
theories." 82 A.L.R. 2d, 1218, 1229, "Distinc-
tion Between Assumption of Risk and Contributory 
Negligence." 
This Court has frequently recognized the difference 
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In 
Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404 (Utah 1960), the Utah Court 
recognized this distinction: 
"Contributory negligence is based on carelessness, 
inadvertence and unintended events, but assumption 
of risk requires an intelligent and deliberate 
choice to assume a known risk. Assumption of risk 
requires knowledge by Plaintiff of a specific 
defect or dangerous condition caused by Defendant's 
negligence or lack of due care which Plaintiff 
could have, but voluntarily and deliberately failed 
to avoid and thereby assumed the risk of the in-
juries he sustained. On the other hand, contribu-
tory negligence requires evidence only that Plaintiff 
failed to use the care for his own safety which an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would use 
under the existing circumstances." Id. at 411. 
The 19 73 statute states that: "As used in this Act, contri-
butory negligence includes assumption of the risk." Contrary 
to Plaintiffs1 assertion, this language was obviously intended 
to insure that assumption of the risk remain as a measure of 
negligence in comparative cases. Often, assumption of the risk 
will be merged into contributory negligence but other times it 
will remain distinct and separate. 
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4 
For example, in an automobile intersection collision/ 
the sole measure of negligence will be the negligence or 
contributing negligence of each driver; assumption of the risk 
would have no part in such a case. On the other hand, however, 
a strict liability or products case in which contributory 4 
negligence is not a defense would involve entirely the misuse 
or knowledge of a defect by the consumer and would necessarily 
i 
involve the measurement of that knowledge, i.e. the consumer's 
assumption of the risk. In that case, if the consumer's 
negligence in assuming the risk was equal to or greater than * 
the danger created by the Defendant no recovery would be 
allowed. In the third type of case, such as the instant case, 
elements of both active negligence and assumption of the risk 
may be present in which case the jury must be instructed as to 
the elements of each. 
i 
The trial court, in this case, carefully separated the 
assumption of the risk instructions from the ordinary negligence 
instructions and, in fact, no reference to negligence is made i 
in any of the assumption of risk instructions (12, 13 and 14). 
It thus must be assumed that the jury based its 90% award 
i 
of negligence against Plaintiffs upon their failure to use 
I 
-10-
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ordinary and reasonable care and did not consider their 
conduct in assuming a known risk. 
In retrospect, the instructions on assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence could have been combined to 
allow the jury to conclude that Plaintiffs1 conduct in assum-
ing the risk of the defective wiring and potential loss of 
power constituted negligence which should have been weighed 
in addition to the other elements of contributory negligence. 
Had this been done, the jury would have been given even more 
acts and omissions of Plaintiffs from which to conclude they 
were in fact negligent. Thus, the separation of the instructions 
and the special verdict form actually was an advantage to 
the Plaintiffs and a disadvantage to the Defendant. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that negligence and 
assumption of risk have distinctly different elements which need 
to be considered. Therefore, it must be presumed that the 
legislature intended the elements of assumption of risk and 
ordinary negligence to be considered by a jury in arriving at 
its percentage determination. The fact that assumption of risk 
standards are used in determining elements of negligence does 
not add undue influence to a Defendant's affirmative defenses 
any more than it detracts from a Plaintiff's theory for 
liability. In both cases, the jury must weigh all factors 
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on both sides in determining the negligence of the respective 
parties. 
In this case, the jury found that the Plaintiffs were 
90% negligent in their conduct and additionally found that 
they had assumed the risk of any loss. Since the assumption < 
of the risk instructions did not refer to negligence and 
since the special interrogatory on assumption was separate, 
i 
subsequent; and apart from the negligence interrogatory it is 
clear that even if it were error to instruct on assumption of 
risk that such error was not prejudicial. j 
As stated by this Court in Simpson v. General Motors 
Corporation, 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970): 
"The parties have had a full and fair opportunity 
to present their evidence in arguments upon the 
issues to the Court and the jury, who after due 
consideration and deliberation have made their 
determinations thereon. This is the objective • 
of a trial. When it has been accomplished, the * 
administering of even-handed justice to both 
sides demands that there should be some solidarity 
in the result so it can be relied upon. Accord-
ingly, the established rule is that all presump-
tions favor the validity of the verdict and the € 
judgment; and they will not be over-turned unless 
the attacker shows that there is error which is 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
the result would have been different." Id. at 40 2. fl 
The jury had ample evidence to find negligence on the 
part of the Plaintiffs regardless of the doctrine of assumption 
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of risk. The Plaintiffs failed to use proper wiring for the 
power supply of their chicken coops and failed to provide 
for emergency generators or power outage alarm systems. Such 
action showed that Plaintiffs failed to use ordinary and 
reasonable care which a prudent person would have done under 
the existing circumstances regardless of any knowledge 
Plaintiffs had of any specific defect. 
It should also be borne in mind that the special 
interrogatories allow the judge latitude in interpreting 
any inconsistency which the jury may have found and was free 
to accept or disregard any such inconsistency. In this case, 
the trial court didn't have to rule at all because the jury's 
answer to the negligence questions rendered the assumption of 
risk question moot. 
For these reasons, the submission of the jury instruc-
tions combined with the special interrogatories did not consti 
tute reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
EXHIBIT 33 AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the trial court erred 
by failing to admit a copy of Rules and Regulations of the 
-13-
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< 
Public Service Commission governing an electric utility 
company. Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court should < 
have given instructions to the jury on the applicable rules 
of the Public Service Commission. A review of these regula-
i 
tions as compared with the pleadings of Plaintiffs show that 
no error was committed. 
Section 58-36-21 quoted by Appellants (page 14, Appellant's ^ 
Brief) is inapplicable to Defendant since there was no showing 
that its equipment was unsafe or did not meet the National 
Electric Code. If anything, this section would apply to 
Plaintiffs1 own electrician who installed and maintained the 
malfunctioning equipment on Plaintiffs' part of the service 
line. 
Likewise, Rule 11 is unapplicable to this case. In 
brief, this rule is concerned with: (1) maintenance of the 
power companies' side of the system; (2) reporting defective 
equipment to the Public Service Commission or local authori-
ties and? (3) furnishing to the user reasonable assistance 
and information regarding maintenance of the customer's system. 
In the instant case, it was not the Defendant's equip-
ment that failed but rather that of the Plaintiffs'. Plain-
tiffs did not plead any negligence on the part of Defendant 
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in failing to report potentially defective wiring to the 
Commission nor was there any showing that such a report 
would have any effect whatsoever upon the loss. Finally, 
there was no evidence that reasonable assistance and inform-
ation was not always given to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant. 
Consequently, the trial court was correct in refusing to 
admit the regulations into evidence, inasmuch as they had no 
applicability to the loss and would have been merely irrel-
evant and immaterial surplusage. Even an examination of the 
annotation cited by Plaintiffs (Plaintiffs1 Brief, page 16) 
reveals that the safety codes or standards must be relevant 
and applicable to the alleged negligent conduct of a 
defendant in order to be admissable. 
CONCLUSION 
The instructions to the jury on assumption of risk 
by the trial court did not unfairly prejudice the Appellants 
but, in fact, reduced the acts or omissions upon which the 
jury could have concluded that Plaintiffs were contributorily 
negligent. The careful separation of the assumption of risk 
instructions from those of negligence and the separation and 
sequence of the question in the verdict prevented any prejudice 
-15-
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from occuring. Even if it were assumed arguendo that the 
interrogatory improperly inquired concerning assumption of 
risk, such an error would clearly be harmless since the jury 
had already concluded that Plaintiffs were 90% negligent 
without considering the assumption of the risk elements. 
Finally, the trial court properly excluded regula-
tions and statutes which were irrelevant to the issues plead 
and the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs. 
For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the trial 
court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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